The new paradigm in Europe: is Goldilocks going global? by Mark A. Wynne & John Thompson






Issue 5 September/October 2000
Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has ex-
perienced a combination of high growth and low
inflation that has made it the envy of the world.
Some argue we have entered a new era, one in
which the old rules no longer apply. Others argue
the country has benefited from a series of favor-
able supply shocks that have simultaneously low-
ered inflation and unemployment. While com-
mentators may disagree over what is and isn’t new
about the New Paradigm, the fact remains that the
U.S. economy is experiencing a combination of
output growth, inflation and unemployment not
seen since the onset of the productivity slowdown
in 1973.
What is new about the New Paradigm is the
proximate cause of the high growth and low infla-
tion experienced over the past five years—rapid
technological innovation. But given the ease with
which technology can be transferred between
nations, the question arises of why only the 
United States seems to have benefited from the
computer revolution. Despite its large domestic
market and highly educated workforce, Europe
hasn’t exhibited the same performance. There’s
As part of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ ongoing efforts to support
effective economic policies, the bank hosted a conference in March 2000 
entitled Dollarization: A Common Currency for the Americas? The question
mark in the conference title signaled attendees that both sides of the dollar-
ization debate would be represented.
Dollarization
When a nation officially dollarizes, it abolishes its own currency and 
formally adopts the U.S. dollar as legal tender. Advocates argue that dollar-
ization helps establish fiscal and monetary credibility because inflating the
currency to cover fiscal deficits is no longer an option. For the same reason,
dollarization helps maintain price stability. Accordingly, dollarization can lower
transaction costs for trade and investments. It also eliminates the devaluation
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(continued on page 7)reason to believe, however, that the
process of European integration—as
manifested most recently in the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) single-market initia-
tive and the launch of economic and
monetary union (EMU)—is setting the
stage for the emergence of the New
Paradigm in Europe.
U.S. Economic Strength
The United States is enjoying its
longest economic expansion ever. Over
the past five years, GDP growth has
averaged 4 percent a year, while infla-
tion has averaged less than 3 percent.
But robust growth and low inflation don’t
tell the whole story. Unemployment rates
are at a 40-year low, and, unlike the 
pattern of previous expansions, produc-
tivity growth has increased over the
course of this one. Stock market gains
have boosted the wealth of millions of
households, and burgeoning surpluses
have allowed the federal government to
start paying down the national debt.
So far, only the United States has
simultaneously experienced the combi-
nation of rapid GDP growth, low infla-
tion, low unemployment and high pro-
ductivity growth. While some European
countries may exhibit one or more of
these features, none has them in the
same combination. For example, while
inflation in the EU is lower than in the
United States, unemployment is higher
and GDP growth is lower. The UK is
experiencing low inflation and low
unemployment but has not grown at 
the same rate as the United States. And
Ireland, dubbed the Celtic Tiger, has
grown at rates far in excess of the United
States’ but is experiencing its highest in-
flation in 15 years.
Table 1 compares key economic indi-
cators for the United States and Europe.
1
Average annual GDP growth over the
past five years was 1.6 percentage points
faster in the United States than in Europe.
In fact, Europe experienced a mild growth
recession in recent years, due in part 
to fallout from the Asian crisis. Inflation
was low and falling in both the United
States and Europe from 1995 until last
year. Indeed, for most of that period,
Europe posted the better inflation per-
formance, as candidates for EMU strove
to bring inflation rates down to German
levels. Inflation rose in both the United
States and Europe over the past year and
a half, primarily as a result of higher oil
prices. Inflation in Europe has also been
adversely affected by the euro’s decline
against the dollar.
Some have argued that the struggle
to meet the stringent Maastricht criteria
for EMU participation was a key contrib-
utor to Europe’s sluggish output growth
and high unemployment in the latter half
of the 1990s. However, it seems more
likely that labor market rigidities were
the main factor keeping unemployment
high. European unemployment has been
declining since 1997, but the jobless rate
is still more than twice that of the United
States.
Europe has done well in terms of
productivity, at least in the industrial sec-
tor, where productivity growth has been
consistently positive and solid since
1994. While cross-country comparisons
of productivity are difficult, some past
measures have shown manufacturing 
productivity in France and Germany ex-
ceeding that of the United States.
But even with strong productivity per-
formance in the industrial sector, Europe
has been outperformed by the tech-fueled
American economy through much of the
1990s and into the new millennium.
Chart 1 shows the trends in overall labor
productivity growth for the United States
and Europe.
2 During the first half of the
decade, these trends were not all that
different. But since 1995, there has been
a persistent and growing gap between
U.S. and European productivity growth.
The acceleration in U.S. productivity lies
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GDP growth 4.0 2.4
Unemployment 4.8 10.0
Inflation 2.6 1.9
Productivity growth 1.9 1.5
NOTES: All numbers are annual averages. European produc-
tivity growth is for the 11-nation euro area only. 
GDP is through first quarter 2000. Inflation is
through July 2000. Unemployment is through June
2000. Productivity is through first quarter 2000.
SOURCES: Eurostat; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of
Labor Statistics; European Central Bank.
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growth.at the heart of the New Economy, making
it possible for rapid growth, low unem-
ployment and low inflation to coexist.
Many factors have contributed to
America’s robust economic performance.
Adoption of new technology—par-
ticularly information technology—has
allowed many businesses to become
more efficient. Deregulation and crum-
bling trade barriers have exposed U.S.
firms to intense competition, spurring
innovation and leaner production sys-
tems. The U.S. labor market remains 
one of the most flexible in the world,
making it easier for businesses to re-
spond to rapidly changing conditions.
Mature financial markets have provided
the capital needed to develop new ideas
and move discoveries from the labora-
tory (or garage) to the marketplace.
Finally, relatively low capital gains taxes
and use of stock-option-based compen-
sation have encouraged entrepreneur-
ship and risk taking, which in turn have
sustained growing business activity.
Until very recently, the prospects for
Europe participating in the New Para-
digm looked decidedly weak. A long 
history of government intervention re-
inforced market rigidity, propping up
Industrial Age corporations with subsi-
dies and delaying much-needed restruc-
turing. Heavy reliance on bank lending
as the primary source of business capital
worked against new business develop-
ment. Laws intended to promote job
security discouraged hiring and pro-
moted a rigid labor market. Conflicting
and confusing regulatory regimes across
European borders increased uncertainty
and inhibited interstate commerce. “Euro-
sclerosis” was the diagnosis, and the con-
dition seemed terminal. But things may
be changing.
Europe
With America experiencing its
longest expansion ever, many European
leaders are looking across the Atlantic in
search of the recipe for the “just right,”
Goldilocks economy. While it is unlikely
Europe will be able, or even want, to
replicate every aspect of the U.S. experi-
ence any time soon, the prospect of the
New Economy emerging there is no
longer just wishful thinking. A variety of
market and political trends are creating
the institutional infrastructure that may
transform Europe from its current torpor
to a more dynamic environment.
Competition. One of the key factors
that contributed to the New Economy’s
emergence in the United States is the
intense competitive environment Ameri-
can firms face, both from within and
from overseas. For example, the overall
level of tariff protection is lower in the
United States than in Europe. In 1996,
the average tariff on all products in the
United States was 5.2 percent, while the
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Chart 1
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since 1994.average in the EU was 7.7 percent. Gov-
ernment bailouts of ailing firms are rare
in the United States, and the federal gov-
ernment has never been deeply involved
in the day-to-day activities of business,
as has often been the case in Europe.
Fierce competition in the U.S. market-
place has forced American firms to raise
performance levels. To stay viable, they
have had to boost productivity, become
more efficient and pursue myriad busi-
ness innovations.
European integration, which began
with the Common Market’s creation
more than 40 years ago, has gradually
intensified the competitive pressures
firms in Europe face. The first step was
the elimination of formal tariff barriers to
trade, which was rapidly accomplished.
A more radical step was taken in 1986
with the passage of the Single Market
Act, which required the elimination of
nontariff barriers to trade by 1992. These
moves toward greater openness (at least
vis-à-vis other EU members) have been
accompanied by privatization of nation-
alized industries and deregulation. Com-
bined, these measures have enhanced
the competitive environment in Europe,
although as Chart 2 shows, firms there
are still less exposed to global competi-
tion than their U.S. counterparts.
Entrepreneurship. It seems obvious
that entrepreneurship is central to eco-
nomic growth. Yet surprisingly little effort
has been devoted to studying entrepre-
neurship or understanding what policies
best promote it. One recent study found
that variations in rates of entrepreneur-
ship may account for as much as one-
third of the variation in economic growth
across countries. The same study found
that at any given time, 8.5 percent of 
the U.S. population is involved in start-
ing new businesses, the highest percent-
age of any country.
3
Historically, Europe has been a less
friendly environment for entrepreneur-
ship. High taxes on profits, dividends
and other types of capital gains have dis-
couraged risk taking and constrained
business initiative. In France, two-thirds
of profits from stock options are taken 
in taxes. Excessive bankruptcy penalties
have long stymied entrepreneurial initia-
tive, with legislation erring on the side 
of protecting creditors. Failed entrepre-
neurs rarely get a second chance.
Cultural norms have generally been
incongruent with those that allow entre-
preneurial spirit to thrive. The high value
European countries traditionally place
on social cohesion has as a corollary an
unwillingness to accept high levels of
income disparity. Many Europeans would
be glad to see a homegrown equivalent
of Microsoft but unwilling to accept the
concentration of wealth that would
accompany it.
However, there are signs the entre-
preneurial environment in Europe is
changing. Most important, many coun-
tries have cut taxes to encourage capital
formation and new business initiatives.
Germany recently announced one of the
most dramatic tax reforms, which will
see the top income tax rate fall from 
53 percent in 1999 to 47 percent in 2003.
France is following suit, with proposals
to cut the corporate income tax rate for
small and medium-sized enterprises
from 36.6 percent to 33.3 percent. In
1998 the European Commission pro-
posed a variety of measures to foster
entrepreneurship, including simplifying
the process for starting a company, im-
proving access to seed capital and 
fostering “the spirit of enterprise.” Differ-
ent attitudes about risk taking, new tech-
nology and new products are taking hold.
Entrepreneurs are viewed more favor-
ably, and outdated regulations restricting
competition are slowly being dismantled.
Venture capital alternatives and equity
markets, both essential to facilitating entre-
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European Union United Statespreneurial activity, are increasingly gain-
ing ground.
Financial Markets. Many consider
Europe’s financial system another obstacle
to realizing New Economy growth in the
Old World. Traditionally, debt financing
has been the primary vehicle for funding
European business ventures, putting
powerful European banks in total con-
trol of financing. As a result, start-up
firms with little in the way of tangible
assets to offer as collateral often had 
difficulty raising capital. Additionally, a
variety of regulatory barriers have im-
peded institutional investing in venture
capital and private equity markets.
In contrast, the American financial
system has been well equipped to handle
the technology-driven demand for seed
funding. Regulatory and structural changes
in the late 1970s cleared the way for
pension funds, insurance companies and
mutual funds to invest in venture capital
and private equity funds. This deregu-
lation made it much easier for entre-
preneurs to take their ideas from the
drawing board to the marketplace. The
difference in financial systems is under-
scored by the fact that real business in-
vestment in America increased almost
twofold between 1990 and 1999 but rose
only 16 percent in Europe.
Despite these past difficulties, the
outlook for Europe’s financial markets
now appears much brighter. The euro’s
much-anticipated unveiling in 1999 be-
gan the development of a single Euro-
pean capital market. The unifying force
of the new currency will make capital
markets more efficient in the long term.
Another sign of strengthening Euro-
pean financial markets is the growing
popularity of venture capital funding.
European venture capital funding in-
creased significantly in 1999 and is ex-
pected to double or triple over the next
few years.
4 To complement the matur-
ing venture capital market, Internet and
other technology incubators are spring-
ing up throughout Europe. In some
cases, new businesses have rushed to go
public, bypassing venture fund oppor-
tunities altogether. The creation of Le
Nouveau Marché in France and the Neuer
Markt in Germany has further broadened
the funding opportunities for start-ups.
Yet another encouraging trend can
be seen in European equity markets.
Share ownership is becoming more 
common, and a shareholder culture is
emerging. The seeds of this culture were
planted by the privatization of national-
ized industries, such as airlines, telecom-
munications firms and utilities. Much of
the deregulation and privatization is being
driven by directives from the European
Commission.
The development of a shareholder
culture is likely to lead to a shakeout in
many industries. Management will in-
creasingly have to answer to sharehold-
ers and not to broader state interests or
stakeholders. The understanding that firms
belong to shareholders and not bosses
or society will replace the existing para-
digm, and European managers will be-
gin feeling the kinds of pressures their
American counterparts have long en-
dured. Return on equity and earnings
growth targets will force firms to become
more efficient and productive.
Technology. New information tech-
nologies have been key to the recent rise
in U.S. productivity. Large investments in
information technology in the early ’90s
paved the way for higher output growth
in the latter half of the decade. In gen-
eral, the use of computers, the Internet
and mobile telephones is lower in
Europe than in the United States. More
than 90 percent of U.S. white-collar
workers use a PC, compared with only
55 percent of Europeans. The United States
has one PC for every two people, while
the ratio is one for every four in Europe’s
big industrial economies (Chart 3). How-
ever, some individual European coun-
tries exceed the United States in Internet
and mobile telephone use, in particular,
the Scandinavian countries. Finland and
Sweden are home to leaders in mobile
telephony (Nokia and Ericsson), and by
most accounts Europe is leading the
mobile Internet revolution.
About one-third of Europeans own a
cell phone for personal use; in Finland
and Sweden, the figure is closer to two-
thirds. The number of people connected
to the Internet via a wireless device is
expected to grow dramatically in coming
years. Furthermore, Europe has already
adopted a single digital cellular tele-
phone standard, while the United States
continues to rely on multiple, incom-
patible standards.
Labor Markets. Even with large pro-
ductivity gains from business innovation,
it’s unlikely technology alone can lead to
sustained rapid output growth across
Europe. Low labor force growth means
that it would take productivity growth
rates well in excess of those in the
United States to propel comparable out-
put growth in the euro area. As Chart 4
shows, since the early 1990s labor force
growth in Europe has been running 
at about half the U.S. pace. To realize
New Economy levels of output growth,
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Germany France United Kingdom Finland Norway EU11 United StatesEurope would have to draw deeply on
its pool of unemployed workers and
attract more workers into the labor force.
In Germany the labor force has
shrunk in five of the past eight years. 
Ireland has been one of the few Euro-
pean countries posting rapid labor force
growth, but it is too small to have much
effect on areawide aggregates. Labor force
participation rates remain much lower 
in Europe than in the United States. Ac-
cording to recent estimates, slightly more
than two-thirds of Europe’s working-age
population participates in the labor
force, compared with nearly four-fifths
of America’s.
Cultural and language differences
across borders have been a deterrent to
European labor mobility. It’s the Conti-
nent’s rigid labor markets, however, that
have long drawn reformers’ ire. In the
past, powerful labor unions systemati-
cally averted efforts to increase busi-
nesses’ flexibility to hire and fire work-
ers. The absence of this flexibility has
undermined global competitiveness by
hampering firms’ ability to respond to
changing market conditions. The down-
sizing of U.S. firms a decade ago created
room for companies to exploit new 
market niches. The use of flexible work
contracts and other forms of temporary
employment—more common than in
Europe—have also enhanced the effi-
ciency of America’s labor market, freeing
workers to move from industries in de-
cline to those growing rapidly.
Current trends, however, suggest
that Europe’s labor markets are becom-
ing less rigid. As rules become less strict,
more workers have been hired on fixed-
term contracts or as part-timers, reducing
labor costs. Policy changes in Italy,
Spain, Germany and France have further
mobilized labor markets. These “friction-
free” policies have reduced the social
cost of dismissing workers and made 
it more attractive to hire younger and
lower paid workers.
Some European countries have also
adopted  “making work pay” policies,
such as tax incentives for entering
employment. These policies have stimu-
lated employment in France and the
Netherlands. While the dynamic effects
are still uncertain, it is commonly agreed
that the efficacy of such policies
depends on flexible labor markets and
the easing of hiring constraints.
The Future
Europe is increasingly trusting mar-
ket solutions and resisting the tempta-
tion to legislate commerce. UK-based
Vodafone AirTouch’s hostile takeover 
of Germany’s Mannesmann is a good 
example. Hostile takeovers were once
taboo in Germany, and when the bid
started to materialize, many expected the
German government to kill the deal. In
the end, though, the state backed down
and allowed the massive transaction.
There is still room for improve-
ment. It is far more expensive to start a
business in Europe than in America, and
some regulations continue to stifle firms
and discourage job creation. Gaps in 
the law result in insufficient protection 
of intellectual property. Prohibition of
stock options in France continues to
impair entrepreneurship and new com-
pany growth.
However, as the countries of Europe
become more integrated, sharing a com-
mon currency and a market bigger than
the United States by about 100 million
people, the competitive pressures firms
and governments will face cannot but
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Notes
1 The data are for the European Union (EU), which consists of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The euro area (EU11) consists of all these countries except
Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, starting
January 1, 2001, Greece will also adopt the euro.
2 The data for Europe refer to the 11-nation euro area only.
3 Paul D. Reynolds, Michael Hay and S. Michael Camp (1999), “Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor,” 1999 Executive Report, Babson College,
Kauffman Center and London Business School, p. 3.
4 Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999).
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’00 ’98 ’96 ’94 ’92 ’90 ’88 ’86 ’84 ’82premium built into many countries’ in-
terest rates since the domestic currency
cannot be depreciated. Advocates also
argue that an increase in credit to small
and medium-sized companies and a nar-
rowing of income distribution are likely.
Dollarization opponents point out
that the dollarized country loses control
of its monetary policy and say that this
loss is too costly. Dollarization limits the
central bank’s ability to serve as lender of
last resort to troubled commercial banks
during a banking crisis. Critics contend 
it is often the countries with very weak
banking systems that consider dollariza-
tion. One of the most common arguments
is that it is simply the wrong policy: it de-
lays a country from establishing sound
macroeconomic and fiscal policies.
Sen. Connie Mack, chairman of the
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S.
Congress, opened the conference with a
strong affirmation of dollarization. The
Florida senator said that dollarization
would do more to ensure the long-term
economic health of the nations in this
hemisphere, more to expand trade, more
to enhance economic stability and more
to increase standards of living and create
jobs than any other single policy shift he
is aware of. Mack introduced a related
bill taken up by the U.S. Senate Banking
Committee: the International Monetary
Stability Act (S.1879, Nov. 8, 1999). This
bill creates a framework for the United
States to compensate dollarizing coun-
tries for the seigniorage they lose by
abandoning their domestic currencies.
Seigniorage is the revenue countries earn
from the difference between the cost of
printing money and the money’s official
worth. Responding to criticism that dol-
larization would undermine a nation’s
sovereignty, Mack said dollarization
would not interfere with a nation’s ability
to create its own fiscal, regulatory or
most other public policies.
Despite Mack’s comments, much of
the conference focused on debates over
what dollarization prevents nations from
doing. One of the big questions raised
by dollarization opponents was whether
the benefits warranted the surrender of
monetary sovereignty—especially to a
country whose monetary policy would
not necessarily be consistent with the in-
terests of the dollarizing country. A Fed-
eral Reserve decision to hike interest
rates to cool inflationary pressures in the
United States might have a deleterious
impact on a dollarized country with low
inflation, no growth and excess capacity.
These issues led some speakers to won-
der whether any exchange-rate regime
but a flexible one could succeed. Later
discussions revealed that dollarization’s
limit on the central bank’s ability to serve
as a lender of last resort could be a bless-
ing or a curse.
Hyperactive Central Banks
In responding to concerns about the
restrictions that dollarization imposes on
the lender of last resort function, Guillermo
Calvo, director of the Center for Interna-
tional Economics at the University of
Maryland, addressed the issue by charac-
terizing Latin American central banks as
hyperactive. Calvo said it is not unusual
during financial crises for central banks
to print money to create the liquidity re-
quired for bailing out commercial banks.
Surrendering the freedom to inflate, he
argued, is not really surrendering the
ability to stabilize, since inflating is not
stabilizing. “Power comes from credit and
not from printing money,” he said. In other
words, national creditworthiness is more
important than a good printing press.
Continuing on this theme, Inter-
American Development Bank chief
economist Ricardo Hausmann added 
that the term lender of last resort is a
misnomer; the correct phrase would be
borrower of last resort. According to
Hausmann, a serious problem for emerg-
ing market countries is “original sin,”
which he calls the unstable currency his-
tory of most emerging-market countries.
That history and lenders’ fears of it being
repeated severely limit borrowing options
in emerging-market countries. For exam-
ple, if a firm in an emerging market
needs money, it can only borrow in its
local currency for the very short term; for
the long term, it can only borrow in dol-
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Dollarization’s limit
on the central bank’s
ability to serve as 
a lender of last
resort could be a
blessing or a curse.lars. However, if a company borrows in
dollars, it will have a currency mismatch,
and if it borrows short-term, it will typi-
cally have a maturity mismatch.
When exchange rate pressures materi-
alize under these financial market cir-
cumstances, central banks have difficulty
adjusting. If the central bank lets the
exchange rate go, the consequences for
the companies that have currency mis-
matches are not good. Andrew Powell,
chief economist at the Central Bank of
Argentina, emphasized that because of
the currency mismatches, currency de-
valuation can dramatically increase the
likelihood of defaults. And, if the central
bank defends the currency by tightening
monetary policy, companies that have
maturity mismatches will have trouble
rolling over their debts. Any way the
central bank moves can trigger a finan-
cial crisis. Both Hausmann and Calvo




In the past decade, the six main 
currency-crisis countries—Brazil, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, Russia, South Korea and
Thailand—suffered in varying degrees
the short-term borrowing dilemma Haus-
mann described. Hausmann indicated that
this maturity mismatch is aggravated by
a pegged exchange-rate regime. Under a
pegged regime, a developing country
typically fixes its exchange rate by uni-
laterally pegging its currency to that of
an industrialized country. The develop-
ing country then buys or sells the foreign
money in return for domestic money to
maintain the selected exchange rate. The
volatile circumstances surrounding small
open economies—including terms-of-
trade shocks and sudden changes in 
capital inflows—sometimes push ex-
change rates toward overvaluation. Then,
balance-of-payment pressures materialize.
Investors become nervous that when a
devaluation occurs, it will be much more
severe than if the currency had been
allowed to float. The financial crises of the
1990s witnessed such megadevaluations,
and as a result, the pegged exchange-
rate regime has virtually disappeared as
an option.
According to Sebastian Edwards, pro-
fessor at the University of California at
Los Angeles, countries in the region now
have two choices: dollarize or freely
float. A floating exchange-rate regime is
one in which the central bank has no
commitment to support a given ex-
change rate. It sets the money supply
and then allows the exchange rate to
fluctuate in response to economic condi-
tions that affect supply of and demand
for the currencies.
Fear of Floating
Edwards pointed out that we lack
substantive historical experiences in
either floating or dollarization. Panama
had been the only dollarized country in
Latin America until Ecuador’s recent
decision to dollarize. Mexico, Brazil,
Chile and Colombia have abandoned
their pegged regimes in favor of floating.
However, Calvo and Edwards ques-
tioned whether these countries really
float. Calvo explained that emerging-
market countries have a “fear of float-
ing.” Edwards maintained that instead of
floating, developing countries often have
pegged regimes in disguise. If these
countries float at all, they, in Calvo’s
words,  “float with a life jacket.” This
means that even though they are oper-
ating under flexible rates, or a floating
regime, they will from time to time inter-
vene to stabilize the exchange rate. They
intervene by buying or selling foreign
currency on the foreign exchange market
or by manipulating interest rates through
open market operations.
The reason for this fear of floating
reinforces Hausmann’s observation of
original sin. These currencies don’t have
the recognition or the credibility of de-
veloped countries’ currencies. A devel-
oping country fears what might happen
if its currency is allowed to float. The
resulting volatility of its exchange rate
may scare investors into pulling out their
capital. Consequently, these countries
float with a life jacket.
According to Calvo, while the ex-
change rate does not move in these so-
called floating-rate countries, what does
move is the interest rate because interest
rate intervention is used to shore up
exchange rates. The resulting volatility is
especially striking when compared with
the low interest rate variances of indus-
trialized countries that actually do have
floating exchange rates. Table 1 shows
an 81 percent probability that U.S. nomi-
nal interest rate changes fall within a
plus or minus 50-basis-point band and
an 86 percent probability for Japan. In
contrast, Bolivia has extremely volatile
interest rates and thus only a 26 percent
probability that they will stay within the
plus or minus 50-basis-point band.
Edwards explained that dollarization
makes eminent sense for some countries
but perhaps not for all. He expressed
concern over the difficulty of relative
price adjustments in a dollarized econ-
omy. He warned that the dollarized
country may be buying higher unem-
ployment and pointed out that the coun-
tries with the highest unemployment
rates in the 1990s were the superfixers,
Argentina and Panama. With dollariza-
tion, shocks or sudden unexpected dis-
turbances in the economy are more
costly. If you get a real shock, you need
a movement in relative prices. Edwards
maintained that exchange-rate fluctua-
tions facilitate that movement. Hausmann
agreed: “It is easier to change one price,
the exchange rate, than it is to change a
multitude of labor contracts.”
However, Hausmann offered a com-
pelling argument for dollarization by
questioning the benefits of floating in
economies that are susceptible to shocks.
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Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Floating Exchange-Rate Regimes
Country Period ±25 basis points ±50 basis points
United States 2/73–4/99 59.7 80.7
Japan 2/73–4/99 67.9 86.4
Bolivia 9/85–12/97 16.3 25.9
Peru 8/90–4/99 24.8 32.3
Uganda 1/92–4/99 11.6 32.6
SOURCE: Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart, “Fear of Floating,” forthcoming.
Table 1He used the oil-based Venezuelan econ-
omy as an example. If the price of oil
goes up, the exchange rate will appre-
ciate and vice versa. Using the con-
nection between exchange rate and oil
price movements, Hausmann questioned
whether a country’s residents would
willingly save in their domestic currency
if they were allowed to save in another.
According to Hausmann, sound risk man-
agement requires savings in a currency
that has a negative correlation to income.
People need to have savings with a maxi-
mum buying power when their incomes
are low. When their incomes are high,
having a maximum buying power is less
important. He maintained that if the cur-
rency moves up and down with income,
it has the wrong correlation. People will
want to diversify away from that cur-
rency. Floating in an economy suffering
real shocks will do away with savings 
in the national currency. Assuming that 
the exchange rate can help during the
adjustment period is assuming that the
financial system and everything else will
stay the same, and according to Haus-
mann, “They simply don’t.”
Other conference speakers who sup-
ported dollarization also saw it as a 
policy that might bring economic stabil-
ity. They questioned—along with Haus-
mann and Calvo—the existence of inde-
pendent monetary policies in the region.
Calvo perhaps expressed this notion
most succinctly when he compared an
emerging market economy conducting
its own monetary policy to a small boat
in the middle of the ocean. He said,
“One can say to the boat, ‘You are free
to row.’ Yes, the boat is free to row, but
it probably is not a good idea.”
A Wall Street Perspective
Walter Molano, head of economic
and financial research at BCP Securities
Inc., disagreed. He said the small boat
needs to row in the ocean. The down-
side of dollarization is that it keeps the
boat from rowing, he said, and thereby
limits the development process. Accord-
ing to Molano, dollarized governments
fail to develop the skills and experience
needed to establish macroeconomic
policies to deal with various phases of
business cycles. Molano maintained that
most of Latin America’s fiscal problems
are the result of institutional flaws, and
dollarization does nothing to solve these.
Molano shared a session entitled A
Wall Street Perspective with two other
economists: Michael Gavin, head of eco-
nomic research for Latin America at the
firm Warburg Dillon Read, and John H.
Welch, chief economist, Latin America,
Barclays Capital. According to Molano
and Welch, no country talks about dol-
larization when things are going well,
and they gave Ecuador as an example. 
In 1999 Ecuador’s inflation topped 60 per-
cent, the economy shrank 7 percent, un-
employment reached 17 percent, the cur-
rency plunged 67 percent against the
dollar and the banking system collapsed.
Ecuador responded by dollarizing. Molano
argued that fiscal reform and privatiza-
tion were needed—not dollarization.
Gavin countered by emphasizing 
that the most appropriate question for
countries with weak fundamentals is
which exchange-rate regime best limits
the damage that can be done. Gavin
said, “When the fundamentals are weak
enough, simply avoiding a hyperinfla-
tion is the first imperative of macroeco-
nomic policy. Nothing good has ever
happened in an economy that is having
a hyperinflation. Monetary integration—
dollarization—clearly makes sense for the
basket cases.” Welch extolled a sound
fiscal policy: “Fiscal policies are by far
and away the most important. Once you
get a reasonable fiscal policy, then 
you can go about dealing with these
other issues.”
The Wall Street session built upon a
presentation by University of California
at Berkeley professor Barry Eichengreen,
who introduced the concept of timing.
He explained that implicit in the dollari-
zation debate are two very different
views of when to dollarize: the dollarize-
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toward overvaluation.last school and the dollarize-first school.
The common view is that to work
smoothly, dollarization must occur after
major economic reforms are in place.
This way, dollarization locks in reform.
The dollarize-first school takes the oppo-
site position. Since major reforms take
time, dollarization should be instituted
first, thus initiating reforms. This is
Ecuador’s approach. Some of Molano’s
concerns were substantiated by Eichen-
green’s models and data-based conclu-
sion that reform should precede dollar-
ization—or at least that dollarizing in
advance of other fundamental reforms is
risky business.
Though dollarizing before reforms
might be risky, research by Andrew Rose,
professor at the University of California at
Berkeley, implies that it is a chance worth
taking. In his presentation, Rose con-
cluded, “The best estimate is that coun-
tries with the same currency trade over
three times as much with each other 
as countries with different currencies.”
1
Rose expounded on this increased trade’s
impact on growth by referring to the
work of Frankel and Romer (1999).
2 They
found that when the ratio of trade to GDP
increases one percentage point, income
per capita increases between 0.5 percent
and 2 percent. Rose made a powerful
argument for the possible welfare gains
through growth via dollarization.
The Importance of Politics
University of California at Santa Bar-
bara professor Benjamin Cohen added
another dimension to Rose’s argument.
Cohen asked, “Why would any rational
person oppose anything that might lead
to lower interest rates, greater price 
stability, deeper financial markets, more
trade?” His answer was no surprise:
“Well, it is politics….Politics does matter.”
Cohen discussed sovereignty con-
cerns, including the loss of seigniorage,
which can often be a source of emer-
gency income when other sources are
harder to secure. Robert Stein, staff direc-
tor, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Eco-
nomic Policy, and Kurt Schuler, senior
economist, Joint Economic Committee,
had addressed this issue earlier in the
conference while explaining Mack’s dol-
larization bill. The bill would allow the
U.S. Treasury secretary to rebate quar-
terly 85 percent of lost seigniorage, the
revenue the dollarized country would
have earned by printing its own money.
Although governments regain a percent-
age of their lost seigniorage, they are still
limited by the bill’s provision of quar-
terly rebates. Cohen is concerned that the
inability to raise money quickly could add
to a country’s vulnerability, especially in
times of national security threats.
Cohen also emphasized the vital role
money plays as a national symbol. He
said that most nation-states are not nat-
ural entities but are created and require
nurture. Loyalty is fostered through a
variety of national symbols: the flag, the
anthem, sports teams, national language
and money. Cohen warned that the psy-
chological effects of adopting a foreign
currency could include loss of a strong
national identity. He cautioned that gov-
ernments should take this seriously.
As the debate wound down, it be-
came more evident that the obstacles to
dollarization are at least as much politi-
cal as they are economic. Carlos Menem,
former president of Argentina, gave a
compelling argument for dollarization 
in his keynote address. But Martín Lagos,
vice governor of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, opened his presentation by
saying that “the current Argentine
authorities are not seeking any change 
in the currency arrangements or regime
prevailing in Argentina since 1991.” Re-
gardless of how much Menem advocates
dollarization, he is no longer president,
and the current administration is not
actively pursuing dollarization. This does
not mean the issue is dead in Argentina.
Menem quipped that he would be back
in 2003 as president.
3
Guillermo Ortiz, governor of the
Bank of Mexico, likewise gave no indi-
cation that Mexico would give serious
consideration to dollarization any time
soon. Mexico began floating at the end
of 1994 because it had no more reserves.
Ortiz said he is now “convinced that the
floating exchange-rate regime has been
extremely good for Mexico.” He pointed
out that floating has not been an impedi-
ment to economic recovery or to reduc-
tion in inflation (Chart 1).
In closing, Dallas Fed President Bob
McTeer told the audience dollarization
was “about as close to a free lunch as
you can get.” Emphasizing that he was
speaking for himself and not for the Fed-
eral Reserve, McTeer said, “Governments
could get the benefits of greater price
stability cold turkey without having to
suffer decades of austerity to reach that
point on their own.”
—Sherry Kiser
Kiser is an associate economist in the
Research Department and coordinator 
of the Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 Andrew K. Rose (Nov. 23, 1999), “Does a Currency Union Boost Inter-
national Trade?” This paper is a nontechnical version of Rose’s work-
ing paper, “One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common
Currencies on Trade,” which is forthcoming in Economic Policy.
Rose’s model is estimated using a data set with 33,903 bilateral trade
observations spanning five different years. His sample contains 320
observations in which two countries trade and use the same currency.
2 Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer (1999), “Does Trade Cause
Growth?” American Economic Review 89 (June), pp. 379–99.
3 When Menem was elected president in 1989, Argentina’s economy
was experiencing hyperinflation. In 1991, the Argentine Congress
passed the Convertibility Law, which established a currency board-like
system that forbids monetizing government deficits. Under a currency
board, the monetary authority issues money against a foreign currency
only at a fixed exchange rate. Since Argentina instituted the Converti-
bility Law, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and Argentine peso 
has remained pegged 1:1, and Argentina’s average annual rate of infla-
tion fell from 600 percent (1983–91) to 4.6 percent (1992–98).
Menem left office in December 1999.
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Copies of the dollarization conference
speeches and papers can be found 
on the Dallas Fed web site at
http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/dallas/
events/dollarspeech.htmlhe Eleventh District experienced a broad-based slow-
ing in employment growth in the second quarter and
into July. Texas employment growth slowed to 1.8
percent (July over May). The August Beige Book also reported
signs of cooling. However, after bottoming out in April, private
month-over-month employment growth picked up again and
was a healthy 4.4 percent in July. At the same time, the Texas
unemployment rate fell to 4.1 percent—the lowest rate in 26
years. These developments suggest that tight labor markets are
playing a role in slowing the District economy.
Part of the moderation in growth, however, is simply a
return to “average” growth rates following the breakneck pace
of late 1999 and early 2000. Texas exports, for example, grew
at an annualized rate of 9.5 percent in the first half of 2000—
down from 29 percent in 1999. Slower growth in interest-rate-
sensitive sectors such as construction are also a factor. Employ-
ment grew only 0.7 percent (annualized rate, July over May) in
this sector, down from yearly averages around 6 percent.
Any softening of the Texas economy, however, is moder-
ated by continued growth in the high-tech sector and the
recovery of the oil and gas industry, a recovery that is still in
its early stages. Oil and natural gas prices remain at very high
levels. Employment growth in this sector—1.5 percent for July
2000 over July 1999—should pick up speed in the second half
of 2000. Overall, despite the second-quarter slowing, the Texas
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May–July 2000
Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Employment Growth Slowing
Percent (seasonally adjusted)
* July 2000 data are annualized.
Real June 2000 dollars* Real June 2000 dollars*
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TEXAS EMPLOYMENT* TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT*
Texas Private New
Leading Index TIPI† total Mining Construction Manufacturing Government service-producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
7/00 126.6 130.7 145.5 559.4 1,082.2 1,554.7 6,048.0 9,389.8 1,903.9 742.7
6/00 126.1 129.6 146.7 557.5 1,079.7 1,569.8 6,023.2 9,376.9 1,906.1 740.7
5/00 125.8 129.0 146.3 555.7 1,078.1 1,589.9 6,012.6 9,382.6 1,911.7 743.4
4/00 126.9 128.4 146.2 558.4 1,075.5 1,562.7 6,004.9 9,347.7 1,906.5 742.6
3/00 127.9 128.4 146.5 553.4 1,081.0 1,559.4 6,000.2 9,340.5 1,900.7 739.8
2/00 126.7 128.0 145.9 550.7 1,080.7 1,552.4 5,973.3 9,303.0 1,898.1 738.3
1/00 125.8 128.2 146.0 547.1 1,080.5 1,550.7 5,956.3 9,280.6 1,894.1 738.0
12/99 126.4 128.2 145.7 541.2 1,078.2 1,543.3 5,949.7 9,258.1 1,903.6 734.1
11/99 124.6 128.2 145.4 537.4 1,077.1 1,535.2 5,926.3 9,221.4 1,906.0 734.5
10/99 124.3 127.5 145.2 533.4 1,077.8 1,534.3 5,908.0 9,198.7 1,904.2 734.0
9/99 123.4 126.7 144.1 531.9 1,079.2 1,535.8 5,891.3 9,182.3 1,895.1 734.1
8/99 123.9 126.7 143.8 527.2 1,080.1 1,531.5 5,876.6 9,159.2 1,890.3 733.4
* In thousands.  † Texas Industrial Production Index.
For more information on
employment data, see “Reassessing
Texas Employment Growth” (Southwest
Economy, July/August 1993). For TIPI,
see “The Texas Industrial Production
Index” (Dallas Fed Economic Review,
November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, July
1990). Online economic data and
articles are available on the Dallas
Fed’s Internet web site,
www.dallasfed.org.
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